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Abstract
The catastrophic fire at Grenfell Tower on 14 June 2017 killed 
72 people and shocked the world. It also changed many 
more lives forever. As well as the police and public inquiries, 
which are ongoing, it led to an independent review of 
Building Regulations and Fire Safety, led by Dame Judith 
Hackitt, a Chartered Engineer and Fellow of the Royal 
Academy of Engineering. 
Her review, and the associated activity around building 
regulations in England, is the most significant review in over  
a generation, since the 1984 Building Act, and is widely 
recognised as being a once in two generations opportunity  
to reform building regulations in England. It will also have 
implications in Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, which 
are watching closely. Moreover, it will extend beyond  
building regulations, which apply up until a building is 
complete and handed over, into the operation of the  
building and subsequent maintenance and minor works.  
This review activity is being watched closely outside the UK 
too, with three states in the Australian Commonwealth 
introducing legislation related to cladding on tall buildings  
in October 2018.
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This paper summarises the activity associated with the review, and 
also considers where we are likely to see changes in practice as 
a result of Grenfell Tower. Many have said that the industry must 
change in order that we reduce, as far as is humanly possible, the 
prospect of any such fire occurring again. 
Dame Judith was asked to focus on “High Rise Residential Buildings” 
(HRRBs), with a twofold purpose: 
• To make recommendations that will ensure we have a sufficiently 
 robust regulatory system for the future;
• To provide further assurance to residents that the complete system 
 is working to ensure the buildings they live in are safe and will 
 remain so.
Dame Judith was asked to: 
• Map the current regulatory system (i.e. the regulations, guidance 
 and processes) as it applies to new and existing buildings through 
 planning, design, construction, maintenance, refurbishment and 
  change management; 
• Consider the competencies, duties and balance of responsibilities 
 of key individuals within the system in ensuring that fire safety 
 standards are adhered to; 
• Assess the theoretical coherence of the current regulatory system 
 and how it operates in practice; 
• Compare this with other international regulatory systems for build- 
 ings and regulatory systems in other sectors with similar safety 
 risks; 
• Make recommendations that ensure the regulatory system is fit 
 for purpose with a particular focus on multi-occupancy high-rise 
 residential buildings. 
The review began by calling for evidence from interested parties. 
As well as contributing to responses by the Construction Industry 
Council and Royal Academy of Engineering, CIBSE responded with a 
detailed contribution on façade engineering aspects of the review 
developed by a working group of the Society of Façade Engineers1. 
Dame Judith’s interim report was published on 18 December 20172, 
in which she concluded that the current system of regulation of 
HRRBs is not fit for purpose.
Dame Judith commented on some of her observations during the 
initial phase of the review, saying: “I have been shocked by some of 
the practices I have heard about and I am convinced of the need for 
a new intelligent system of regulation and enforcement for high-rise 
and complex buildings that will encourage everyone to do the right 
thing, and will hold to account those who try to cut corners. 
“Changes to the regulatory regime will help, but on their own will 
not be sufficient unless we can change the culture away from one of 
doing the minimum required for compliance, to one of taking 
ownership and responsibility for delivering a safe system throughout 
the life-cycle of a building.”
She gave extended evidence later that day to the Communities and 
Local Government Select Committee of parliament3. This underlined 
her concerns and set out a number of reasons for them:
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1) Current regulations and guidance are too complex and unclear. 
This can lead to confusion and misinterpretation in their application 
to high-rise and complex buildings;
2) Clarity of roles and responsibilities is poor. Even where there 
are requirements for key activities to take place across design, 
construction and maintenance, it is not always clear who has 
responsibility for making it happen;
3) Despite many who demonstrate good practice, the means of 
assessing and ensuring the competency of key people throughout 
the system is inadequate. There is often no differentiation in com-
petency requirements for those working on high-rise and complex 
buildings;
4) Compliance, enforcement and sanctions processes are too weak. 
What is being designed is not what is being built and there is a lack 
of robust change control. The lack of meaningful sanctions does not 
drive the right behaviours;
5) The route for residents to escalate concerns is unclear and 
inadequate;
6) The system of product testing, marketing and quality assurance is 
not clear.
In late January there was an industry summit, which was accompanied 
by a statement which reinforced the interim findings and set out the 
next steps:
• The current system for ensuring fire safety in high-rise and 
 complex buildings is not fit for purpose;
• A culture change is required, with industry taking greater 
 responsibility for what is built – this change needs to start now;
• This applies throughout the building life-cycle, both during con- 
 struction and occupation;
• A clear, quick and effective route for residents to raise concerns, 
 and be listened to, must be created.
The Report set out six broad areas for change:
• Ensuring that regulation and guidance is risk-based, proportionate 
 and unambiguous;
• Clarifying roles and responsibilities for ensuring that buildings are 
 safe;
• Improving levels of competence within the industry;
• Improving the process, compliance and enforcement of regul- 
 ations;
• Creating a clear, quick and effective route for residents’ voices to 
 be heard and listened to;
• Improving testing, marketing and quality assurance of products 
 used in construction.
The second and final phase of the Review set out to develop practical 
solutions that will deliver these areas of change and support the 
direction of travel set out in the Interim Report. Nothing short of a 
major overhaul of the whole system was envisaged, and Dame Judith 
undertook to work with all those who shared her ambition and drive 
to create a new and robust regulatory framework and system that 
supports this. Across all sectors of the industry she called for radical 
thinking about the immediate actions that could be taken to lead to 
sustainable change.  
Industry leaders at the summit committed to work to create a new 
system that will work effectively and coherently, with working groups 
formed to develop innovative solutions in the following key areas:
Design, construction and refurbishment: Establishing what in-
dustry and regulators need to do to fully embed building safety 
during the design and construction phase;
Occupation and maintenance: Identifying what building owners, 
landlords and regulators need to do differently to ensure that building 
safety is prioritised when a building is occupied and throughout its 
life-cycle;
Products: Determining how the product testing and marketing reg-
ime can be improved;
Competency: Establishing how competency requirements for key 
individuals involved in building and managing complex and high-risk 
buildings should change;
Residents’ voice: Determining the best way for residents to be given 
a clear, quick and effective statutory route for raising concerns on fire 
safety;
Regulation and guidance: Resolving whether central Government 
ownership of technical guidance is the most appropriate model for 
complex and high-risk buildings.
An expert group was also formed by the Ministry of Housing, 
Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) to inform the 
government response to the recommendation to consider how the 
suite of Approved Documents could be structured and ordered to 
provide a more streamlined, holistic view, while keeping the right 
level of relevant technical detail. The author chaired this working 
group. Its recommendations were submitted in March to Dame 
Judith and accepted in full in her final report. In response to Grenfell, 
MHCLG also established a very comprehensive web-based compend-
ium of Grenfell-related information4.
Dame Judith’s final report was published by government on 18 May 
20185. In response to her remit, to “make recommendations that 
ensure that the regulatory system is fit for purpose with a particular 
focus on multi-occupancy high-rise residential buildings”, the report 
focuses on “higher risk residential buildings”, defined as residential 
buildings over 10 storeys. However, Dame Judith notes that a number 
of her recommendations should extend to multi-occupancy buildings. 
This has prompted considerable debate, and current thinking within 
the Construction Industry Council (CIC), which brings together all 
the professional bodies in the industry in England, is that her 
recommendations should apply to all multiple-occupancy residential 
buildings, regardless of height. 
The report envisages a new regulatory system, bringing the Fire 
Service, Health and Safety Executive and Building Control services 
together in a “Joint Competent Authority” (JCA), which is proposed 
to oversee both construction and operation of higher-risk buildings, 
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and to take responsibility for the enforcement of the Building 
Regulations and other relevant legislation relating to HRRBs (see 
Chapter 1). It calls for a series of Gateways for new HRRBs and major 
projects on existing HRRBs, which would entail significant scrutiny 
and sign-off by the JCA. It also envisages a role for the JCA in 
overseeing a safety case system for existing HRRBs through the whole 
operating life of the building (see Chapters 2 & 3).
The report calls for radical change in the current Building Regulations 
and associated guidance (Chapter 6), and for provision of full digital 
models for all new higher-risk buildings, and for them to be 
maintained through the life of the building (Chapter 8). 
However, it is Chapter 5 that sets out the (potentially) most far-
reaching recommendations for CIBSE and its members, and indeed 
for all professionals, relating to competence. Recommendation 5.2 of 
the Review calls for the professions to come together to provide a 
new and more robust and effective system for recognising and 
maintaining competence. The terms used in the Report could not set 
a clearer challenge to the built environment professions, and merits 
reading in full.
Dame Judith, a past-President of the Institution of Chemical Engineers, 
was clear that professional bodies in the built environment and 
property and fire safety sectors must find a way to work together. 
She calls on government to supervise the process and, if we cannot 
deliver, to step in. The message is really clear, and the response was 
almost immediate, with a working group being formed.
Other key recommendations from the report that will impact building 
services engineers include:
• A clear model of risk ownership, with clear responsibilities for the 
 client, designer, contractor and owner to demonstrate the delivery 
 and maintenance of safe buildings. The project team will be held 
 to account by the new JCA. This new body will have powers 
 during both construction and operation of a building, and for 
 existing buildings;
• A set of rigorous and demanding duty-holder roles and respon- 
 sibilities to ensure a stronger focus on safety during a building’s 
 design, construction and refurbishment. These roles will be 
 broadly aligned with the Construction (Design and Management) 
 Regulations. Penalties for those “who choose to game the system 
 and place residents at risk”, as Dame Judith describes them, will 
 also be more serious.
• Moving towards a system where ownership of technical guidance 
 rests with the industry, with oversight by government. A clearer 
 package of regulations and “truly outcomes-based” guidance 
 which will be simpler to navigate while reflecting the level of 
 complexity of building work. It acknowledges that “prescriptive 
 regulation and guidance are not helpful in designing and building 
 complex buildings, especially in an environment where building 
 technology and practices continue to evolve, and will prevent 
 those undertaking the work from taking responsibility for their 
 actions”; 
• A more effective product-testing regime with clearer labelling and 
 traceability because “the current process for testing and ‘cert- 
 ifying’ products for use in construction is disjointed, confusing, 
 unhelpful, and lacks any sort of transparency”. Poor procurement 
 practices to be tackled to ensure high-safety, low-risk options are 
 prioritised and full life-cycle cost is considered when a building is 
 procured;
• A digital record from initial design intent through to construct- 
 ion, including any changes that occur during occupation, is also 
 called for, effectively producing a model similar to one created 
 under BIM Level 2. This digital model will create “a golden 
 thread of information” about each HRRB which is handed over 
 to the owner. The information can then be used to demon- 
 strate to the regulator the safety of the building throughout its 
 life cycle; 
• Clearer rights for residents are also proposed, as well as 
 responsibilities where resident activity can create risks that may 
 affect others.
Much of the report is eminently sensible and says a lot of things that 
have needed saying for some time, although there is still a lot of 
detail to be resolved.
It is not yet clear how the government will proceed to address the full 
package of recommendations, but the Secretary of State for Housing, 
Communities and Local Government has already set out what will 
happen next: 
• Government has consulted on restricting the use of desktop 
 studies as a means of assessing the fire performance of external 
 cladding in lieu of an actual fire test. The consultation sought 
 views on whether desktop studies should be used at all, and 
 whether or not they are appropriate for construction products, 
 wall systems, or for any other purpose;
• Government has consulted on clarifications to Approved 
 Document B (Fire) over the summer and on banning the use of 
 combustible materials in cladding systems on high-rise buildings. 
 Legislation on this point is thought to be imminent at the time of 
 writing. A full technical review of Part B of the Regulations, and of 
 the Guidance, is also very likely.
The full Government response was promised for “late autumn 2018” 
and so may have emerged by the time you are reading this paper. 
In the meantime, Grenfell is not the only high-rise fire to have 
occurred. In Melbourne, Australia, the Lacrosse Building suffered a 
significant fire to which aluminium composite panels contributed. 
There were no casualties, and the sprinkler system helped to control 
the spread of the fire. There was also a multi-storey hotel fire in 
Ballymun, Dublin recently. Thankfully, again there were no serious 
casualties but the building suffered significant damage. Following a 
full investigation, the State of Victoria has now introduced legislation 
to limit the use of such material on buildings in the State. New South 
Wales has also introduced new regulations. Queensland, which has 
an unknown number of buildings with potentially-combustible 
cladding, has introduced legislation requiring owners of high-rise 
buildings to register them with the State Building Control Commission 
by next March, and those that appear to be at risk of having 
combustible cladding will then be investigated further. It is not just 
England that has the problem with this cladding. 
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Grenfell was an awful event, and has devastated many lives. There 
does appear to be a resolve to change the way that we build and 
manage high-rise residential buildings in the UK, but we are now 
getting to the challenge of starting to deliver change, and not talking 
about it. In the meantime, it is clear that the problems we have in 
England are not unique, and those elsewhere are also taking a close 
look at the way they regulate their buildings in the light of their own 
experience, and also that at Grenfell.
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